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DISCUSSION OF RECENT DECISIONS
PARTITION

op RE.AL ESTATE TRUSTS--Of considerable inter-

est to the profession is the decision of the Supreme Court of
Illinois in the case of Aronson v. Olsen,1 wherein partition was
denied of certain real estate held by the Lake View State Bank,
as trustee, upon a bill filed for that purpose by some of the
beneficiaries of the trust against their co-beneficiaries.
The opinion discloses that the title to the property was originally held by the trustee for the parties litigant, who, desiring
to erect an apartment building upon the premises, entered into
a written agreement for the purpose of erecting, financing, maintaining and operating such building. The parties then directed
the trustee to convey the title to one of them, Olsen, who procured a mortgage on the premises. Thereafter, subject to the
trust deed executed by him to secure the mortgage indebtedness, Olsen by deed conveyed the property in trust to the Lake
View State Bank, as trustee, to be held by the trustee upon the
1 348 Ill. 26, 402.
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terms of a certain declaration of trust contemporaneously executed, in and by which the interests of the respective parties
were fixed and defined. Among other provisions, this agreement
stipulated that the beneficiaries were to manage the property,
pay all taxes or assessments levied on the premises and maintain and enjoy the property as if they were the absolute owners
of the same. The bill of complaint alleges that the income of
the property was at all times insufficient to pay expenses of
maintenance and interest on the mortgage; that the complainants were required to and did advance sums of money from time
to time for the payment of taxes, repairs and interest on the
mortgage; that the defendants had failed to pay their ratable
share of such expenses; that the defendants, while managing the
property, had collected the rents and failed to account for the
same; that further capital investments, such as the installation
of electric refrigeration, were necessary to insure the parties
against further loss; that the defendants refused to contribute
toward the cost of the same and that the complainants could no
longer advance the necessary funds to carry on the venture.
The bill prayed an accounting for sums due from the defendants; for a dissolution of the partnership and for a partition
of the property and, if it should not be susceptible of division,
that a sale be decreed, the proceeds of said sale, after settling
the mutual demands of the beneficiaries, to be divided according
to their respective interests. The master's report found that
the complainants had sustained the allegations of the bill and
recommended that the relief prayed be granted. A decree was
entered 2pursuant thereto and was ultimately reversed on writ
of error.
In reversing the trial court and holding that it was error to
grant partition, the court, speaking through Mr. Justice Heard,
said: "By the deed of trust the entire legal and equitable title to
the property was expressly vested in the trustee, and the interest
of each and every beneficiary, and of all persons claiming under
them, was declared to be personal property. Under this agreement it was expressly stipulated that no beneficiary should have
any right, title, or interest in or to any portion of the real estate.
The defendants in error had, therefore, no such interest in the
land, either legal or equitable, as would authorize them, as beneficiaries under the trust, to a partition of the premises." In
reaching this conclusion the court recited the provisions of the
2 It may be noted that the commissioners appointed to make partition
reported that the premises were not susceptible of partition, and a
further decree was entered ordering a sale of the property in accordance with the prayer of the bill. This decree was reversed after the
court rendered its opinion in the appeal from the decree granting partition. 348 Ill. 402.
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trust agreement and with reference to it said: "It is agreed and
understood between the parties hereto, and by any person or
persons who may become entitled to any interest under this trust,
that the interest of any beneficiary hereunder shall consist solely
of the right to receive the proceeds from rentals or from sales of
said premises, and that such right in the avails of said property
shall be deemed to be personal property and may be assigned and
transferred as such; that in case of the death of any beneficiary
hereunder during the existence of this trust, his or her right and
interest hereunder shall pass to his or her executor or administrator and not to his or her heirs-at-law, and that no beneficiary
now has, and that no beneficiary hereunder at any time shall
have, any right, title or interest in or to any portion of said real
estate as such but only an interest in the proceeds as aforesaid, it
being the intention of this instrument to vest the full legal and
equitable title to said premises in said trustee." The court then
proceeded to say that the rights of the beneficiaries in the property were not rights as co-partners, but as individuals, and that
the accounting sought for was between them as such. In this
controversy the Lake View State Bank was held to be uninterested and not a proper party. Insofar as the bill prayed for an
accounting between the beneficiaries, it was not the proper subject of a bill for partition of the real estate held by the trustee
and, for that reason, the bill was found to be multifarious. The
cause was reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss the
bill.
It may readily be seen that the court in denying partition
rested its decision on the provisions of the deed in trust and the
trust agreement by which the entire title, both legal and equitable, was sought to be vested in the trustee and by which the parties stipulated that their interest in the property embraced in
the trust was personal property. It thereby recognized the validity and effectiveness of such a provision as a means of divorcing the beneficial ownership of land from an interest in the property itself and wedding it to the conscience of the trustee.8
8 An historical analogy may possibly be found in the status of uses
in the early common law and prior to the Statute of Uses. This device
of land holding was invented by the clergy for the purpose of evading
the Statutes of Mortmain and by the laity for defrauding creditors and
feudhl superiors. Here the trustee was the sole owner of the land and
the cestui of the use had no more than a moral right to enforce the obligation against the conscience of the trustee by applying to the clergy
acting as confessors for assistance against a fraud or breach of trust.
Not until the reign of Henry V did the Chancellor undertake to enforce
this right and it was not until the reign of Edward IV that the "equitable estate" became a recognized concept in the law of real property.
The result reached by the Aronson case has been accomplished by legislation in some states, notably California, New York, Michigan, Wisconsin and Minnesota. See 2 Pomeroy's Equity Jur., sec. 978 et seq.
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Because of the particular ground upon which the court placed
its decision and because of the result reached, the case has been
the subject of widespread comment.
Such comment naturally elicits academic inquiry into the
soundness of the decision as well as speculation upon the practical results that ultimately may be achieved by the use of this
form of trust in the ownership of real property. It has been suggested that the decision marks another step in the evolution of
a new rule of property in Illinois. How far and to what extent
the principle shall be enlarged is a matter of some doubt, but the
course is not the less certain if the decision in the instant case is
to be accepted in its entirety. The implication is clear; the authoritative weight of the decision as a basis for new applications
of the doctrine is a matter of conjecture. 4 Any comment on the
case requires a brief reference to well established rules governing the partition of real property in Illinois in order to grasp
the significance of that feature of the decision touching upon the
conversion said to have taken place. To entitle the complainants
to partition it is essential that they be seized as tenants in common 5 of some estate or interest, either legal or equitable, 6 in the
property described in the bill of complaint and that neither they,
nor any one under whom they claimed, have agreed not to partition or have imposed any condition or restriction on their estate
from which a covenant or agreement not to partition might be
implied.7 That the parties are co-owners is insufficient,5 for
there must be as well a unity of possession upon which rests
their undoubted right to have their severalties made known.
When the estate is legal, partition is a matter of absolute right;
when it is equitable, some discretion is exercised accordingly as
the title is a meritorious one, or as considerations of convenience
and necessity affect the complainants' right to relief. That the
4 To illustrate a novel departure suggested by the case; it has been
urged that a new device for land financing is now open to prospective
mortgagees who wish to eliminate foreclosure and the period of redemption. The borrower would be required to create such a trust and
then assign the beneficial ownership of the same to secure the debt.
Upon default the shares might be sold in the same manner as personal
property pledged to secure a debt and the purchaser would then be in
a position to direct the trustee to convey the title to the property to
him as the absolute owner, unaffected by judgments or other liens that
do not attach to the property itself.
5 Ross v. Cobb, 48 Ill. 111; Hill v. Reno, 112 Ill. 154; Owen v. Village of
Brookport, 208 UIl. 35; Tanner v. Tanner, 326 Ill. 302; Cahill's lul. Rev.
Stat. (1931), Ch. 106, par. 1.
8 Gregory v. Gover, 19 1l. 607; Bissell v. Peirce, 184 Ill. 60; Johnson
v. Filson, 118 lI. 219; 1itch v. Miller, 200 Dl. 170; Dicus v. Scherer,
277 1ll. 168.
7 Hasterlik v. Hasterlik, 316 l. 72; Arnold v. Arnold, 308 Ill. 365.
S McConnel v. Kibbe, 43 Ill. 12; Stevenson v. Bachrach, 170 IlM.253.
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parties in the instant case had the beneficial ownership of the
property, and also a unity of possession, at first seems evident;
but the court was impelled to disregard both their beneficial
ownership and the possessory aspect of their rights because of
the light in which the court regarded their title or interest in
the property itself, or better, the absence thereof.
Whitaker v. Scherrer,9 which was relied upon by the court,
proceeded upon the ground that the trust agreement was to be
construed as containing implied covenants against partition, and
that to grant partition would be to violate the agreement of
the parties. Whether either of the two grounds mentioned would
have been a sufficient answer to the bill in the Aronson case may
be doubted. However, since the language of the opinion does
not proceed upon that reasoning, it may be assumed its conclusion rests upon the only other ground remaining-that the
parties had converted their interest in the land to an interest
in personalty-and it is to that view that an attentive criticism
may possibly be directed.
The legitimate query is whether any such thing as "conversion" by contract or agreement of the parties exists independently of the doctrine of equitable conversion, that is, whether
conversion may be created by express declaration in and of itself.
A casual examination of the doctrine of conversion as it is applied in a court of equity discloses a seeming' fallacy in the
premise of the principal case which ought not pass unnoticed.
The doctrine of equitable conversion is a creature of equity and
is embodied in the maxim that what ought to be done is considered in equity as done. It is a mere fiction of the law employed
in a court of equity to carry out the assumed intention of the
settlor or testator by means of which real or personal property,
which is made the subject of a trust or equity, is regarded as
being in that form which it would ultimately assume in the
hands of the beneficiary if the directions of the will or deed
were carried out. 10 No express declaration is necessary, but an
9 313 Ill. 473.
10 Fletcher v. Ashburner, 1 Bro. C. C. 497; Craig v. Leslie, 3 Wheat.
563.
"Conversion has been defined as that change in the nature of property by which, for certain purposes, real estate is considered as personal,
and personal estate as real, and is transmissible and descendible as
such."
3 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. 126.
"The doctrine of equitable conversion is embodied in the maxim that
'What ought to be done is considered in equity as done,' and its meaning is that whenever the holder of property is subject to an equity in
respect of it, the court will, as between the parties to the equity, treat
the subject-matter as if the equity had been worked out, and as impressed with the character which it would then have borne."
John
Adams, The Doctrine of Equity, 135.
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absolute direction that the land shall be sold and converted into
money is an essential requisite. There is no room for the application of the doctrine unless the equitable "ought" is made to
appear, for the conversion takes place not by virtue of the express declaration but from the duty imposed on the trustee to
sell and convert. In the absence of such duty (and such duty
arises only where the direction to sell is mandatory), there is
no conversion. The reason for this is that the doctrine is purely
equitable. In fact no conversion has taken place except in contemplation of law on account of the existence of the obligation
on the trustee. This doctrine of conversion is a branch of the
general equitable field of trusts and has been adopted solely for
the purpose of executing trusts, and it is essential to the application of the doctrine that the property should be subject to an
imperative direction for conversion.
A case illustrative of the proposition that the declaration to
convert is really immaterial (except insofar as it may be a guide
in determining whether the direction for sale in a given case
is mandatory or discretionary) is the case of Attorney-General
v. Mangles." Real and personal property was devised to trustees "upon trust, at such times as they his said executors,
might think expedient, to sell, convey, or otherwise convert into
money the same," with a further provision that the property
was to be considered as personal property for the purposes of
distribution and division. The question arose whether a legacy
duty was payable in respect of the portion of the real estate
which was allotted to the legatee under the alternative power
contained in the will. If it passed as realty it would, of course,
be untaxable. The court held that such portions as had actually
been sold should be taxed, but that which was allotted would not
be subject to tax because the executors had a "discretion" as
to that. The language providing that the allotted portions were
to be considered as personal property was rejected, and the court
said with reference thereto, "He could not withdraw it from
liability to legacy duty by saying it should be considered as real
estate; and therefore he cannot say it shall be liable by saying
it shall be considered as personal. "12
In Hyett v. Mekin's the will gave the trustees the power of
sale and further provided that the residuary real estate so bell

5 M. and W. 120.
See also Taylor v. Taylor, 3 DeG. M. & G. 190, where the court
said. "The argument sought to be raised from the testator's declaration
that the proceeds of the real estate should be deemed to be part of his
personal estate, seems to me of no weight."
12

13

L. R. 25 Oh. D. 735.
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queathed should for the purpose of transmission be impressed
with the quality of personal estate from the time of the testator's death. With reference to this provision the court said:
"Now it has not been and could not be contended that a mere
direction of this kind can alter the devolution of real estate from
the devisee to the heir-at-law of such devisee after the testator's
death; but the argument has been that, coupling the direction
with the power of sale given to the trustees which immediately
precedes it, the power must be read as a power in the nature of
a trust . . . and therefore that the will should be read ... as if
There is no actual
it contained an absolute trust for sale ....
and imperative conversion directed by the testator, and I must
treat his language literally as meaning to give the trustees not
an imperative direction to sell, but a power to sell in case they
should see fit to do so. Such a direction does not amount to a
conversion of the real estate by the will."
In the case of Twopenny's Settlement,14 there is an illuminating discussion by Sargant, L. J., of the doctrine of conversion.
He said: "The course of devolution on intestacy of any property or any interest in property, whether such property or interest be legal or merely beneficial, is one of its fundamental
incidents, is governed by the general law of the land, and cannot be altered at the will of the owner by any mere declaration
or contract. But an individual may, by means of a will or settlement, subject property of one kind, such, for example, as
money, to a trust under which it is to be invested in another
kind of property such as land and create beneficial interests in
the land so to be purchased. And in such a case, so long as the
trust is enforceable and notwithstanding that the investment
in land has not in fact taken place, beneficial interests in the
money corresponding with those sought to be created in the land
will devolve as if the trust had been executed, and they had
actually become interests in land. The result is founded on the
principle that equity treats the trustee as having done that
which he ought have done and does not let his failure affect the
rights of the intended beneficiaries. And it is to be noted that
this result in no way conflicts with the general juridical principle of devolution which has previously been stated, since the
effect of the trust if carried out would have been to create new
beneficial interests not in money but in land, and those beneficial
interests would necessarily have devolved according to the rules
relating to the devolution of land. A corresponding result, of
course, takes place under trusts for the sale of land. . . ." The
court further observed that it was necessary that the trust be
imperative and definite; that it would not be sufficient if it
14 L. R. [1924] 1 Ch. 522.
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were permissive only, or if the power is in the alternative and
that declarations were of assistance only in determining in
doubtful cases whether the trust be imperative or not. Language to similar effect is found in the case of In Re Walker :15
"Now, of course, the legislature can, by a simple enactment to
that effect, make personalty devolve and pass to a series of persons successively for the same interests as if it had been realty;
but the only manner in which an individual can do this is by the
creation of an imperative trust for its conversion into realty....
A mere declaration . . . is in itself inoperative, for the whole
doctrine of conversion turns on the maxim that Equity considers to have been done that which ought to have been done
pursuant to a trust; and a mere declaration such as I have
mentioned creates no obligation as to dealing with the property
in one way or another."
As to the effect of such a declaration constituting an equitable conversion, there does not seem to be any authority in Illinois, except insofar as the principal case may be said to infer
it; but it has been frequently decided that an essential requisite for an equitable conversion is the absolute direction that the
land be sold, and that a mere power to be exercised
at the dis16
cretion of the trustee does not work a conversion.
It is to be noticed that if an equitable conversion is deemed
to have taken place, the property is considered to be in its
altered form from the moment the instrument effecting such
conversion comes into force-in the case of a will, from the
death of the testator, and in the case of a deed, from the
moment of its delivery. That, in fact, is the essence of the
doctrine, for while the property may still be in its unconverted
form, yet, there exists the "duty" to convert, or the equitable
"ought," which invokes the operation of the principle. It follows that when the conversion is optional the property is treated
in the form in which it is actually found. 17
15L. R. [19081 2 Ch. D. 705. See also Commonwealth v. Martins' Executors, 5 Munf. (14 Va.) 117, and Wheless v. Wheless, 92 Tenn. 293,
holding there was no conversion where the sale was dependent upon
the agreement of the parties as to the time and price of any sale, clearly indicates the limitations upon the doctrine. It differs from the principal case in the respect that there was no express declaration describing the interests as personal property. To the same effect see Cookson
v. Cookson, 12 Cl. & Fin. 121; Robinson v. The Governors of London
Hospital, 10 Hare 19; Condit v. Bigalow, 64 N. J. Eq. 504; Beaver v.
Ross, 140 Iowa 154.
16 Fox v. Fox, 250 fI1. 385; Haward v. Peavey, 128 Ill. 430; Vierieg v.
Krehmke, 293 Ill. 265; Johnson v. Lee, 228 Ill. 167; Johnson v. Filson,
118 Ill. 219; Bissel v. Peirce, 184 Ill. 60.
17 Curling v. May, Mich. Term, 8 Geo. II, cited in Guidat v. Guidat,
3 Atk. 254; Newbould's Estate, 110 L. T. 6; Griffith v. Ricketts (1849),
7 Hare 299; Re Hotehkys, L. R. 32 Ch. D. 408; also eases in footnote 16.
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The fact that the trustee has discretion as to the time of sale
or the price will not prevent the conversion from taking place
and the mere fact that the trustee is directed to sell upon request of the cestuis will not negative a conversion unless the
rights of the beneficiaries are such as amount to a fetter of the
trustee's right to exercise the power.1 s
Another consequence of the doctrine, and one which is of extreme importance in the instant case, is the fact that the beneficiaries have the right to reconvert their interest in the property
from personal character to real character by any act evidencing such intention,"9 provided, however, that if there are
several beneficiaries who have the right to have the property
sold and the proceeds divided, the consent of all parties concerned is necessary in order to work a re-conversion. None has
the right to take the property in its unconverted form if any
one of them object, for it is readily seen that to do so might
in a given case be prejudicial to the parties, as where the land
in its entirety would sell for more and give to each beneficiary a
larger sum than would be the value of his individual parcel
were the property partitioned.20 The right to effect a reconversion is but an incident of the beneficial ownership and where
the parties elect to reconvert their interests the constructive
conversion is at an end, for equity will not compel the doing of
a useless act.
If it is decided that an equitable conversion has taken place,
then it clearly follows that the beneficiaries have no interest in
the land, nor any estate therein. The property is treated to all
intents and purposes as personalty and no one of the cestuis
may have partition thereof. 2' Nor is the levy and sale of the
real estate under execution on a judgment against one of the
beneficiaries of any force and effect to vest the vendee at the
sale with any interest in the land or in the right of the bene1s Johnson v. Lee, 228 Ii1. 167; Twopenny's Settlement, L. R. [1924]
1 Ch. 522; Tazewell et al. v. Smith's Adm., 1 Rand. 313; Russell v.
Hilton, 175 N. Y. 525; Fox v. Fox, 250 1l. 384; In re Taylor's Settlement, 9 Hare, 596; In Re Goswell's Trusts, L. R. [1915] 2 Ch. D. 106;
Wheless v. Wheless, 92 Tenn. 293.
19Beeler v. Barringer, 252 Ill. 288; Ridgeway et al. v. Underwood et
al., 67 Ill. 419; Dunham v. Slaughter, 268 Ill. 625.
2OPasquay v. Pasquay, 235 Ill. 48; Darst v. Swearingen, 224 1l. 229;
Robison v. Botkin, 181 Ill. 182; Lash v. Lash, 209 Ill. 595; Holloway
v. Radcliffe, 23 Beav. 163; Baker v. Copenbarger, 15 Ill. 103.
21Knight v. Gregory, 333 Ill. 643; Buckner v. Carr, 302 Ill. 378;
Metaker v. Metsker, 320 Il. 547; Brown v. Miner, 261 Ill. 543; Fischer
v. Butz, 224 Ill. 379; Burbach v. Burbach, 217 Ill. 547; Lash v. Lash,
209 Ill. 595; Harris v. Larkins, 22 Hun 488; Biffels Estate, 11 Phila. 46;
Barton v. Cannon, 7 Baxter 398, 66 Tenn. 398.
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ficiary to share in the income from the trust or the 22pro-rata
share of the proceeds of any sale made by the trustee.
An assignment of a share in a trust embracing realty which
has been converted conveys no "estate or interest" in the land, 23
and a bequest to a surviving spouse of a share in the proceeds
of a sale of realty of which the husband died seized is not such
a devise of "land or any interest therein" as to bar her dower
rights.24 That the interest will pass to the personal representa25
tive or residuary legatee of the cestuis is likewise admitted.
From the foregoing it readily appears that if the beneficiaries
are found to have effected a conversion of their interests in the
property, then, unquestionably the decision denying partition
is correct. But how can it be said so far as the opinion discloses
that there was an equitable conversion in the Aronson case? A
conveyance is made to a trustee for the benefit of the parties
interested according to their respective shares in the venture.
It is not made to appear whether there was any provision in the
deed of trust or in the declaration of trust requiring the sale
by the trustee at any time. It is undoubtedly true that the
form of agreement used in the Aronson case was similar to that
in use by the various trust companies in Cook County. An inspection of one of the standard forms discloses that there is
such a provision requiring the sale by the trustee at the expiration of twenty years from the date the agreement is entered
into unless a sale is directed before that time by the beneficiaries.
Whether such fact would be sufficient to establish an equitable
conversion is a question of no little difficulty in view of the further provisions by which the trustee agrees to sell prior to that
time only at the direction of the cestuis, and upon the terms
they prescribed, and the further fact that the trustee expressly
disclaims any duties of management or control over the trust
res. That is left entirely to the beneficiaries. They possess the
land and use it in the same manner as if they were the absolute owners thereof except in the matter of making conveyances
of the legal title, which duty is imposed upon the trustee. It
is not the office of this comment, however, to inquire into the
trust phase of the problem. It was not considered material to
the case and cannot be said to have affected the decision in any
way.
22 See cases cited in footnote 20.
28 Gresham Life Assurance Society v. Crowther, [1915] 1 Ch. 214.
24 Fitzgibbon et al. v. Lake et al., 29 I1. 166.
25 Maginn v. McDevitt, 269 Il. 196; Grove v. Willard, 280 Ill. 247.
See Lill v. Brant, 6 I1. App. 366, and Connell v. Crosby, 210 I1. 380,
holding that the doctrine has no application in a court of law.
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It is submitted, however, that if the decision goes to the extent of recognizing in an individual the inherent capacity or
power to change the very nature of things themselves by the
mere force of words, it is unsupported by judicial precedent.
The exact limitations upon the scope and extent of contractual
power which is said to exist inherently in the individual and
which has been recognized and preserved to a great degree by
the fundamental doctrines of the common law have not been,
and cannot be, definitely determined. They must, in the nature of things, remain somewhat variable, expanding and contracting from time to time and in different respects according
to considerations of public policy and social justice affecting
the judicial or legislative view of the time and place. It may
be doubted, however, whether even the most liberal view of
such matters admits of the power or capacity of an individual
to change the substantive nature of things by verbal declarations, however explicit they may be. To say that "this land is
personal property" cannot change the nature of the land itself any more than articles of personal adornment can be
changed to real property merely by saying that they are. To
say that one merely changes his interest in them is just an
invasion of the idea itself, for things do not exist independently
of the persons or objects to which they bear relation. The fundamental distinctions that grew up in the law between real and
personal property certainly do not rest upon the abstract legalistic concept of the thing itself, but rather upon the relationship
which it bears to the things that affect it, the use to which it
is put in human affairs, and the incidents which attach to such
use and ownership. Even in equitable conversion, it is never
denied that the fact remains, though the fiction may operate
to alter relationships which would otherwise exist without the
fiction. It would be perfectly competent for the legislature to
alter these relationships, but it may be doubted whether the
individual can do this outside of the existing scope of the doctrine of equitable conversion.
Looking now to the decisions cited in support of the decision in the principal case we find Williams v. Wiggand,26 which
decided that one who claimed an undivided one-half interest in
certain land by virtue of an alleged contract of sale between
the complainant and the defendant's intestate must first obtain
specific performance of the contract before seeking partition of
that portion to which he claimed title. Insofar as the decision
purports to decide that a legal title is essential to the maintenance of an action for partition in equity it has not been followed in Illinois, as the decisions previously cited dealing with
26 53 fl. 233.
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the right to partition an equitable title clearly indicate. Another case cited, Ward v. Williams,2 7 was a case involving equitable conversion.
Aside from what has already been said concerning the case
of Whitaker v. Scherrer,28 it is sufficient to observe that the
ground upon which partition was there denied-that equity
will not grant partition in violation of one's own agreementcannot be said to support the language of the Aronson case.
There is29 no doubt of the soundness of the view therein expressed.
The case of Duncanson v. L/l/3 may fairly be said to support
the principal case insofar as it is admitted that an equitable
estate of inheritance must necessarily involve a freehold, because it was there held that a bill for specific performance of a
contract for the sale of the beneficial interest in a trust of the
kind involved in the Aronson case did not involve a freehold
so as to permit a direct appeal to the Supreme Court. 81
There are other decisions in Illinois where the same type of
trust agreement was before the court, as in Dicus v. Scherer,8 2
where it was decided that a conveyance by the trustee to one
of the cestuis without an express declaration of trust terminated
the personal character of their interest and vested in them an
equitable estate of inheritance which was subject to partition.
The plaintiffs in error advanced the contention that the proper
course for the complainants to follow would have been to demand that the trustee enforce the accounting sought between
the parties, or, in the event the complainants sought to withdraw from the venture, to demand that the trustee conduct a
sale and make distribution of the proceeds according to the
trust agreement. Upon his failure or refusal to do so, it was
urged that a bill for the dissolution of a trust might be filed
asking for the same relief. The defendants in error, however,
made much of the argument that the trust deed and trust
agreement taken together were a mere appendage to the al27 282 Ill.632.
28313 Il. 473.
29 See Martin v. Martin, 170 11. 639; Blakeslee v. Blakeslee, 268
fI1. 56; Hardin v. Wolfe, 218 111. 48; Seals v. Treatch, 282 li. 167;
Schmidt v. Schmidt, 311 Ill. 458.
80322 DlI. 528.
81 See also Merwin v. Stevenson, 246
l. App. 342, and Sweesy v.
Hay, 324 Ill. 319.
82 277 li. 168. See also Chicago Title & Trust Company v. fllinois
Merchants Trust Company, 329 li. 334, and C. N. S. & M. R. R. Co.
v. Chicago Title & Trust Company, 328 fI1. 610. On the subject of
dower rights bee the Nicoll Cases, 29 Ill. 323; 37 Ill. 387; 49 fl. 358.
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leged partnership agreement, and that it was proper for the
court, if necessary, to dissolve the trust as supplementary relief to the prayer for accounting, dissolution of the partnership
a
The court apparently found against them on
and partition.8
this point. It was then sought to sustain the decree on the
prayer for general relief, but this, too, was denied apparently
on the ground that the aspect of the case would then have been
multifarious. A bill for dissolution of the trust would have
involved the same parties and the same general subject matter, if not the same cause of action, though the relief sought
would, of course, be different, if not inconsistent with the theory
upon which the bill for partition was framed.M
When the court decided that the beneficiaries had no interest
in the property entitling them to partition, it is apparent that
their personal interest in the trust would hardly be susceptible of partition. The only corporeal thing in which they could
have a common right of property was the land itself. Other
than that, it is difficult to see what could be divided. Their
right to share in the profits and the proceeds of any sale, while
termed undivided, in reality is several in character, that is,
each individual possesses or enjoys his right independently of
the rights which others have, almost in the same manner as shareholders in a corporate form of organization.
In conclusion it is submitted that the court erred in upholding
a conversion in view of the provisions of the trust agreement
cited in the opinion. Considering the obvious nature of the
relation between the parties as joint venturers in the purchase
and sale of the real estate and their beneficial ownership, possession, management and control of the property, a rather strained
construction is necessary to say "that they had no such interest
in the land, either legal or equitable, as would entitle them to
partition."
At any rate, dissatisfaction with the decision is
justified by its essential brevity and silence on what are thought
to be the real issues involved.
88 See Bissell v. Peirce, 184 Ill. 60, where the trust was considered
subsidiary to the joint venture held to have been created by the
agreement and relief granted on a bill for partition of the real estate
held by one of the partners as trustee. Also Smith v. Gear, 59 Ill.381
and Hagerman v. Schulte, 349 fl1. 11.
84 "The general rule is that where there is a special prayer for particular relief and also a prayer for general relief, only such relief
will be granted under the latter prayer as is agreeable to, or consistent
with, the case made by the bill. . . . If the prayer is for special relief
and for other relief in addition thereto, no relief which is inconsistent
with the special relief asked for will be granted. That is to say, no
relief can be granted under the general prayer in a bill in chancery,
which is of a nature distinct and independent of the special relief
Ellis v. Hill, 162 Ill. 557.
prayed."
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LIABILITY

OF A

TELEPHONE

COMPANY

TO

THIRD PERSONS.-

Will a telephone company be liable to the owner for loss of his
house by burning because it refused to make requested telephonic
connection for a neighbor who was attempting to call the fire
department? That was the problem before the Massachusetts
Supreme Court in Mentzer v. New England Telephone and Telegraph Company.1
The case arose on the following facts: The house of the
plaintiff caught fire and he endeavored to summon the fire
department. A Mrs. Chase, neighbor of the plaintiff, had a telephone operated by the defendant company, and twice Mrs.
Chase, once of her own volition and once at the request of the
plaintiff, importuned the defendant's operator to connect her
with the fire department of Hudson, a neighboring town, with
which the operator could easily have made connection, but which
the operator wrongfully refused to do. Aid did not arrive for
some time, and the plaintiff's house was destroyed. The suit
in this case consisted of actions sounding in contract or tort for
damages alleged to have resulted from failure of the defendant
to perform its duty in respect to summoning the Hudson fire
department.
One aspect of the case, regarding the plaintiff's use of his
own telephone, need not concern us here. We limit ourselves
to the inquiry as to liability resulting from the defendant's
wrongful refusal to connect Mrs. Chase's telephone with that
of the fire department. Admitting for the sake of argument
that such failure or refusal was the proximate cause of the
damage and that it was a breach of duty owed the subscriber,
is there any liability on the part of the telephone company to
the subscriber's neighbor ?
In the interests of clarity, a consideration of the cases may
be divided, first, into those dealing with the question of contractual liability, and, second, those dealing with that of tort
liability.
In the principal case, in Knesek v. Crown Point Telephone
Co.,2 in Standard Iron Works v. Southern Bell Telephone and
Telegraph Co., 8 indeed in practically all of the cases in this
category much argument is made to assert a contractual relationship between plaintiff and defendant. The beneficiary doctrine
1 276 Mass. 478, 177 N. E. 549.
2 82 Ind. App. 603.
3 256 Fed. 548.
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is relied upon heavily. But the court in the Mentzer Case
makes no peace with this contractual theory, which has long
been disfavored in Massachusetts. The English view, as expounded by Winterbottom v. Wright,4 is adopted.
That case, decided in the Exchequer of Pleas on June 6, 1842,
concerned a complaint by the driver of a coach against the
defendant, who had contracted with the Postmaster General to
keep the coach in repair, for injuries received as a result of
the dilapidation and unfitness of the coach. Lord Abinger, for
the court, after distinguishing between the case before him from
that of Levy v. Landgridge, and saying that in that case the language had been framed to forewarn any suit of the nature of
the case at hand, went on to say: "This is an action of the
first impression.... Here the action is brought simply because
the defendant was a contractor with a third person; and it is
contended that thereupon he became liable to everybody who
might use the carriage ....
There is no privity of contract between these parties; and if the plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or even any person passing along the road, who was injured by the upsetting of the coach, might bring a similar
action. Unless we confine the operation of such contracts as
this to the parties who entered into them, the most absurd and
outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit, would
ensue." To this opinion, Alderson, J., assented with the remark that it was "the only safe rule," and reference was made
to the earlier case of Tollit v. Sherstone.5
Putting the telephone company in the place of the contractor
in the Winterbottom case and the plaintiff in the place of the
coach driver, a more striking analogy could hardly be presented.
The telephone company's contract for service was with the subscriber, and yet for a breach of that service the plaintiff, a
stranger, is attempting to recover. Applying this analogy a
Federal court in Standard Iron Works v. Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company6 refused to allow recovery
where a third person had used a subscriber's telephone to report a fire at his factory, where the telephone company refused
to make the connection, and the third person sued for damages
resulting from such refusal. The court said: "The telephone
over which the said Staggs attempted to secure connection with
the fire department was not the telephone for which the plaintiff
had contracted and which he had in his place of business" and
"[there is] no privity of contract."
4 10 M.

znd W. 109.

5 5 M. and W. 283 (1839).

6 256 Fed. 548.
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In Knesek v. Crown Point Telephone Company7 the facts were
these: A, a subscriber, called B, a subscriber, and requested B
to report a fire at his (A's) house. B attempted to do so, but the
telephone company refused to make the connection. A sued to
recover the statutory penalty allowed in that state for such a refusal. It was held there that there was no recovery, since there
was no showing that A was entitled to use the telephone [of B]
either in person or by her agent.
These decisions necessarily proceed upon the narrow path of
their own facts, but they are motivated by broad principles. It is
upon the theory of contractual relationship that this attempt by
the third person, whose house has been destroyed by fire, to establish between him and the telephone company a legal duty
must survive or perish. Let us examine those principles.
Can the contention of the third person be sustained on the
basis that he is a third person beneficiary even in states which
recognize the beneficiary theory? The Illinois Supreme Court
has set its face firmly against such a possibility by its language
in Searles v. City of Flora:8 "The doctrine [of third person
beneficiaries], however, is not applicable to every contract made
by one person with another from the performance of which a
third person will derive a benefit, but is limited to contracts
which have for their primary object and purpose the benefit
of a third person and which were made for his direct benefit."
This decision was preceded by that of Crandall v. Payne,9 in
which in an agreement between Goodrich and Gibson for the
conveyance of land, title to which was in Crandall, a provision
was made that upon the payment of the purchase price of $5,000,
$1,000 of it should go to Crandall. Crandall was a stranger
to the contract and the provision regarding him was but incidental to the conveyance. The deal was completed and Crandall sued on the contract for $1,000. In denying his claim, the
court said: "The purpose and object of the contract were, not
to benefit him [Crandall], but to benefit the parties thereto."
Though factually different, this same doctrine was enunciated
in the recent case of Carson, Pirie, Scott and Company v. Parrett,10 where the court said that if the benefit of the contract to
the third person was direct he might sue thereon, but if it were
merely incidental he certainly could not."1
82 Ind. App. 603.
8 225 Ill. 167.
9 154 Ill. 627.
10 346 Ill. 252.
11 See also Rodhouse v. Chicago and Alton Ry. Co., 219 Ill. 596;
Webster v. Fleming, 178 Ill. 140; Snell v. Ives, 85 Ill. 279.
7
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Studying these cases, can one say that the contract between
A, the subscriber, and the telephone company was for the primary purpose of benefitting B, whose house caught on fire, or
that such contract was for his direct benefit? Can it be reasonably said that the contract was made, directly or indirectly, by
inference or innuendo, for such neighbor's benefit? Applying
these tests, the contractual liability theory begins to lose color
rapidly. Let us examine other cases and authorities.
The court in the Mentzer Case, in denying contractual duty,
cited Thomas v. Lane12 and Giberti v. James,18 the former being
a case in which a stranger sued a landlord for injuries sustained
because of the landlord's failure to keep his contract of repairs
he had made with the tenant. The court applied the test stated
above and held that the plaintiff was a mere stranger to the
contract and had no rights under it. That Massachusetts is
pledged to this principle is further evidenced by the cases of
Burnham v. Lincoln et al.,14 Lebourdais v. Vitrified Wheel Company,15 and Christensen v. Bremer et al.'6
Gray, in his text, 1T considering the very question we have here
in relation to telegraph companies says that it is clear that the
mere fact that a third person will be benefited by the performance of a contract, gives him, irrespective of the degree that
he will be benefited by it, no right to sue for breach of the
contract, the contract itself must be made for his benefit. Gray
was admittedly attacking the logic of some decisions putting
liability upon telegraph companies--decisions to which we shall
refer later.
In H. R. Moch Company v. Rensselaer Water Company,'3 the
plaintiff sued the water company for damages sustained when
the company failed to furnish sufficient water and water pressure to combat a fire on plaintiff's premises, in breach of a contract which defendant company had signed with the city. Denying any relief on contractual grounds (the plaintiff claimed as
a beneficiary under the contract with the city), Cardozo, J.,
in a very able opinion, said, "The benefit, as it is sometimes said,
must be one that is not merely incidental and secondary ...
12 221 Mass. 447.
18 266 Mass. 70.
14 225 Mass. 428.
15 194 Mass. 341.
16 263 Mass. 371.
17 Communication by Telegraph, pp. 116-117.
18 247 N. Y. 160. See also Peck v. Sterling Water Co., 118 [Il. App.
533.
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It must be primary and immediate in such a sense and to such
a degree as to bespeak the assumption of a duty to make reparation directly to the individual members of the public." This is
directly analogous to the Mentzer Case and those identical to
it and is decided on the same principle as are the opinions of
Evans v. Sperry,19 Simson v. Brown,20 Garnsey v. Rogers,21 and
National Bank v. Grand Lodge.22 The reasoning adopted in these
cases, applied to different factual situations, has also been followed in numerous state decisions, such as McCaffrey v. Mossberg
and Granville Manufacturing Company,28 Sawyer v. Minneapolis and St. Louis Railway Company,24 and25Gotcher v. Southwestern Telegraph and Telephone Company.
Reverting back to the Mentzer Case, we find the court deciding, in effect, that no such intent to benefit the plaintiff existed
there. It is fantastic even to imagine that when Mrs. Chase had
the telephone installed in her home, made the contract for service, both she and the telephone company intended their contract for the benefit of Mentzer, or that they entered into it for
the direct benefit of Mentzer, or that its object was to benefit
Mentzer. In the Rensselaer Water Company Case, the argument was that the water company and the city made the contract with the object of benefiting the citizens of the city, both
as to their consumption of the water and to its use in fire emergencies. But even
there the situation was not strong enough
26
to bridge the gap.
In summary, the language in the Jones' text,27 sets out the
doctrine completely. The text reads, "In order to make this
rule [the right of a beneficiary to sue] binding, there must be
two conditional elements in the contract: First, there must be an
intent to benefit the third person; and second, the promisee must
owe some obligation to the third party."
It may be noted in conclusion, on this point, that the English rule is even more strict, being that no third person can sue
19 12 Fed. (2d) 438.
20 68 N. Y. 355.
21 47 N. Y. 233.
2298 U. S. 123.
23 23 R. I. 381.
24 38 Minn. 103.
25 93 Tex. 114.
26 Many states do not recognize the right of a gratuitous beneficiary
to sue. There exists, however, a diversity of opinion in the water
company cases.
27 Telegraph & Telephone Companies, pp. 603-604.
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interest
under a contract unless he establishes such a beneficial
28
so as to sue as a cestui que trust under the contract.
We have now to refer to the telegraph cases briefly referred
to before and determine how much, if at all, they affect the
proposition under consideration. The doctrine, to be considered,
together with the decisions supporting, has been laid down as
follows: "A third person who is neither the sender nor the addressee [of a telegram] may sue where the message shows or
the company is otherwise informed of his beneficial interest
therein.''29 This statement is supported by Sherrill v. Western
Union Telegraph Company, 0 and Telegraph Co. v. Mellon.81
Perhaps one of the farthest outposts of this doctrine is expressed in the case of Alexander v. Western Union Telegraph
Company,8 2 in which a third person was allowed to recover
on the grounds that since he was mentioned in the telegram his
interest must have been in the contemplation of the parties
at the time of the making of the contract of communication.
This decision, and those in accord with it, together with the expression in a Minnesota court3" that the telephone was, in the
eyes of the law, merely an improved telegraph might give some
countenance to an assumption that the same liability might attach to a telephone company refusing to make a connection when
they had been informed of a third person's vital interest therein.
But is this analogy sound ?
The North Carolina case of Alexander v. Telegraph Company, before cited, actually circumscribes its own limitations by
putting the decision on the ground that the contracting parties
must have made the contract "in contemplation of" the beneficiary's interest since his name appeared in the message. At
the time the contract was made (the reasoning of the court
was) the parties must have had the interest of the beneficiary
in mind and must have contemplated any injury resulting to
him from non-delivery of the message. The very nature of the
liability thus imposed distinguishes this type of case from the
Mentzer Case, for in these telegraph company cases, however
weak they may be otherwise, there is some pretext for saying
that the contracting parties contemplated the third party's interest; while in the Mentzer Case, it certainly cannot be said
28 Gaudy v. Gaud~y, L. R. 30 Ch. D. 57.
29 37 Cyc. 1716.
30 109 N. C. 527.
31 96 Tenn. 66.
32 158 N. C. 473.

38In Northwestern Telephone Exchange Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P.
Ry. Co., 76 Minn. 334.
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that at the time of making the contract the contracting parties
must have contemplated the third person's interest. There was
only one contract in that case, the contract for telephone service made at the time the subscriber requested the installation
of an instrument. All else done after that was in the performance of that contract. There was no new contract when the
subscriber (Mrs. Chase) attempted to secure connection with the
fire department; it was an act done under the old contract with
which the plaintiff (Mentzer) had nothing to do.
That the third person being in contemplation of the contractors at the time of the making of the contract is the principal
thing is further evidenced by the somewhat more settled doctrine that a receiver (addressee) of a telegram may sue for
non-delivery thereof.3 4 A third person whose interest is not evident on the face of the message and is not otherwise known to
the telegraph company cannot sue for non-delivery or delay
in delivery. 85 This line of cases depend on the fact that the parties are deemed to have contracted with the beneficiary's interest
specifically in mind. That being true, such cases lie in a different category from the telephone liability under discussion.
A peculiar case, capable of being distinguished on its particular facts, arose in Texas 30 in which A, as agent for his
mother, attempted on a public long distance telephone to get
in touch with certain brothers and sisters to tell them of the
tragic death of one of their family. The defendant's operator
refused to make the connection. The mother sued and recovered.
But here it is to be noted that the telephone was a public instrument, that the call was a long distance one, for a stipulated
price, and that the person attempting to make the call was distinctly an agent of the plaintiff. The company had no right to
refuse to enter into a contract when the price was proffered 87 and
on its refusal to do so should have been held liable. Obviously
also, if there is an agreement by which the company accepts a
third person into the contractual circle, it will be held liable
on its special arrangement.38
But these exceptions do not disturb the broad, well-defined
principles on which it can be said that there is no contractual
34 Western Union Tel Co. v. DuBois, 128 Ill. 248.

35Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Weniski, 84 Ark. 457; Morrow
v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 107 Ky. 517. See also Postal Tel.
Cable Co. v. Ford, 117 Ala. 672.
36 Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Harris et al., 214 S. W.
845 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919).
37 Central Union Tel. Co. v. Fehring, 146 Ind. 189.
88 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Rowell, 153 Ala. 295.
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liability between the telephone company and third persons generally as in the Mentzer Case and in Knesek v. Telephone Co.,
before mentioned. It remains for us to examine the possible
existence of a tort liability.
An attempt was made in the Mentzer Case to establish a
cause of action in the plaintiff founded on the public nature
of the defendant's business and undertaking-a breach of a
public duty owed the plaintiff. On first blush it might seem that
this contention carried weight. It must be examined with care
to determine whether or not it should prevail.
In the Mentzer Case, the court decided that there was no
"sound ground" for the contention, saying, "The reasonable
expectation of the parties growing out of the installation of a
telephone in the house of Mrs. Chase was that the defendant
would afford its service to her and to the members of her
household. There is no basis in this record for any understanding that the telephone was deemed to be for the protection of the neighborhood with the consequent liabilities on the
part of the defendant to all neighbors, or that the defendant
was reasonably bound to expect any such duty owed by it .....
There was no breach of any public or private duty owed by the
defendant to the plaintiffs in the failure of the operator to convey the message to the Hudson fire department. Such service
is different from that which the defendant professes to render
in the transmission of intelligence whether on the facts of this
record or as a matter of common knowledge. Telephone companies 'cannot be required to furnish a service which they do
not hold themselves out as undertaking to furnish.' "
To determine whether or not a public duty was breached here,
it is necessary to inquire into the exact public nature of a telephone company's duty. It has been defined as a "duty to
serve the public generally, impartially and without discrimination, extending to every member thereof equal facilities under
equal conditions.''8 9 The discriminations here referred to have
been listed as being first, those comprising a failure to serve after
the proffer of the usual price, 40 second, those comprising an inequality of rates and charges, 41 and third, those comprising an
inequality in the character and quality of service.42 Only one
of these prohibited discriminations touches our subject, that
one requiring universal service, and it is to be noticed that this
40

37 Cye. 1650.
Crouch v. Arnett, 71 Kan. 49.

41

The Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Ferguson, 57 Ind. 495.

42

State v. Nebraska Telephone Co., 17 Neb. 126.

39
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public demand applies only to those wishing 4to
"employ"
3
company, only to those who proffer the price.

the

The exact nature of telephone and telegraph companies is
variously conceived. In some jurisdiction (a minority) they are
held to be common carriers or "common carriers of news," 44 in
others it is declared by constitutional or legislative acts that they
are common carriers, 45 while in perhaps the majority of jurisdictions they are decided not to be strictly common carriers. 46 Yet
under none of these views is there any authority for imposing
upon a telephone company a duty to perform a service which it
does not hold itself out as performing.
In North Carolina, a rule seems to have been adopted which
has gone to the furthermost extreme in holding telephone companies liable on the ground of an all-inclusive public duty.47 But
this view is distinctly in the minority and is criticised in the
New Hampshire case of Barrett v. New England Telephone and
Telegraph Company,48 as leading to the award of "unusual
consequential damages. "
The tort liability question arose directly in H. R. Moch
Company v. Rensselaer Water Company, previously referred
to, and Justice Cardozo, in deciding there was no tort liability on the part of the water company for failing to furnish
sufficient water to combat the flames on the plaintiff's premises, said: "The query always is whether the putative wrongdoer
has advanced to such a point as to have launched a force or
instrument of harm, or has stopped where inaction is at most a
refusal to become an instrument for good." In the telephone
cases was not the refusal of the company to relay the fire
alarm merely a refusal to become an instrument for good?
The decision in the Mentzer Case hase been criticised in discussion in the Harvard Law Review. 49 The statement is made:
"Permitting third parties to recover in this manner would not
unduly extend liability. The company must know of the existence
43

Tyler, Allman & Co. v. The Western Union Telegraph Co., 60 Ill.

421.
44 State v. Cadwallader, 172 Ind. 619; Postal Telegraph & Cable Co.
v. Wells, 82 Miss. 733.
45Western Union Tel. Co. v. Eubanks, 100 Ky. 591.
46Western Union Tel. Co. v. Short, 53 Ark. 434; Western Union Tel.
Co. v. Reynolds Bros., 77 Va. 173; Passmore v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 78 Pa. St. 238.
47 Kennon v. Western Union Tel. Co., 126 N. C. 232.
48 80 N. H. 354.
49 45 Harvard Law Review 393.
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of the specific danger threatening the plaintiff." But we have
seen that there was no legal duty owing to the plaintiff by the
company, and it is idle to speak of the extent of liability until
the breach of duty which calls that liability into existence is
established. The article further says: "Liability will thus be
limited to the party whose interest was foreseeably endangered."
But, although it might be considered that the amount of liability
would be foreseeable, it still remains true that to place any liability upon the company in regard to an utter stranger is
placing too much. As the court said in the Barrett Case, previously cited, "When the company is held to the obligation it
would have had if, as a private citizen, it had made the express
contract upon the terms here imposed by law [to furnish indiscriminate service at a reasonable price], the whole object of
the law is attained. Anything beyond this puts an unreasonable
burden upon the public servant."
The Harvard Law Review article also argues that the original undertaking of the telephone company "probably does induce the community, in reliance thereon, to refrain from supplying other means of protection in emergency." This statement not only overlooks the fact that the plaintiff in the
Mentzer Case certainly did not depend on his neighbor's telephone for emergencies, for he had one of his own which, had
he used it properly, might easily have performed the service
required, but puts a crushing liability upon the company on
the nfere assumption of an inducement, which in many cases
may not exist at all. On all its points, the Mentzer Case seems
to be sound law.

